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This paper examines the extent to which private savings responds to the availability of a 
social insurance program. We focus on the Medicaid nursing home assistance program 
and uses variation in state Medicaid policies in the 1960s and 1990s to identify whether 
household wealth correlates negatively with access to public insurance coverage.  We use 
data from the 1962 and 1970 Survey of Consumer Finances and the 1992 through 2002 
Health and Retirement Study.  We find that household savings in 1970 was substantially 
lower in states with easier access to Medicaid assistance and that household savings in 
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Introduction 
One in five persons over the age of 65 will spend at least a year in a nursing home, 
and the majority of nursing home residents will have limited private insurance coverage for 
nursing home costs.1  Expenses in a nursing home average around $60,000 a year (MetLife, 
2004) and in the absence of private insurance, individuals must finance these expenses with 
their own resources or financing from public programs, such as the Medicaid program.   
Given the high cost of nursing home care, Medicaid potentially generates strong 
incentives for older households at risk of incurring nursing home expenses to adjust private 
savings.   Although moral hazard is a general concern for most social insurance programs, it 
is not clear how large an issue it is for the Medicaid nursing home program.  To qualify for 
Medicaid nursing home assistance, an applicant must meet the state’s statutory limit on 
income and assets.  The income and asset thresholds, however, are generally very low.2  The 
stringent financial eligibility criteria for Medicaid nursing home assistance, along with the 
potential stigma associated with claiming public assistance and concerns about the quality of 
Medicaid-financed nursing home care, may deter individuals from relying on Medicaid in the 
future.  Given these competing incentives, the overall effect on private savings is uncertain.  
This paper examines whether, and to what extent, the Medicaid program affects private 
savings.  
Simulation studies have shown that when a social insurance program sets low asset 
standards for eligibility, savings of households who plan to qualify for the program will be 
low (Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes, 1995).  One implication is that private savings of 
                                                 
1 Long-term nursing home care is not a covered benefit for the elderly under the Medicare program, and few 
households carry private long-term care insurance.  
2 In 1992, the monthly income limits ranged between $422 and $724, and the asset limit was $2,000 for most 
states (the range was $1,000 to $4,000). 
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households that plan to use the social insurance program will increase when asset thresholds 
are raised.  The empirical evidence in this regard has been mixed.  Gardner and Gilleskie 
(2006) find a positive relationship between elderly households’ net worth and Medicaid’s 
asset thresholds in the state where they reside, and Powers (1998) finds that private savings 
of low-earning women increased with the increase in  Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children (AFDC) qualifying asset limits in 1981. Hurst and Ziliak (2005), however, find no 
change in the savings of a similar population (female-headed households with children) with 
the loosening of asset limits in the 1996 reform of AFDC. 
Access to Medicaid may affect private savings by reducing the risk of nursing home 
expenses.3  With lower risk of medical expenses, households reduce private savings.  Gruber 
and Yelowitz (1999) find that when the Medicaid program was expanded to AFDC program 
recipients, private savings of the newly-eligible population fell by 18 percent.  Those results, 
however, are based on changes in Medicaid eligibility rules that target low-income, working-
aged households.  The nursing home component of the Medicaid program targets older and 
potentially, higher income households, and there is limited evidence on whether access to 
Medicaid nursing home assistance will induce similar reductions in private savings.4  This 
paper explores whether this component of moral hazard is evident with the Medicaid nursing 
home program. 
Walker (2006) finds some evidence that household wealth is lower in states with less 
                                                 
3 Nardi, French, and Jones (2006), Dynan, Hubbard, and Zeldes (2002), Kotlikoff (1986), and Palumbo (1999) 
find that private savings vary positively with the risk of future medical expenses.  
  4 The evidence to date has been indirect.  Levin (1995) finds a positive relationship between illiquid assets and 
health insurance premiums and argues that the ability to self-insure varies negatively with the proportion of 
illiquid assets in the household's portfolio. Therefore, the relationship suggests households are self-insuring 
against uninsured medical expenses.  Webb (2001) finds no difference in the dis-saving rate between elderly 
households that anticipate nursing home admission and those that do not.  He concludes that there is little 
evidence that households are saving for nursing home expenses. 
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restrictive Medicaid eligibility standards and concludes that at least $24,000 of retirement 
wealth is attributable to saving for nursing home expenses. Those results, however, are 
identified off a policy change that occurred 30 years prior to the date when wealth is 
observed in the data.5  The result of that paper might be biased by unobserved time-varying 
state effects.  To circumvent that issue, this paper focuses on how changes in savings are 
correlated with contemporaneous policy differences. 
The paper examines the savings response from two different time periods. We first 
look back at the period when Medicaid was introduced – the 1960s. The 1960s began with 
very few states offering any public assistance and ended with the majority of states offering 
some public coverage for nursing home care through Medicaid.6  Across states, the eligibility 
standards for Medicaid nursing home assistance varied, providing an additional source of 
variation in access to public insurance for nursing home expenses. We use data from the 
1962 and 1970 Surveys of Consumer Finances (SCF) to compare how household wealth 
differed across different states before and after Medicaid was introduced. We find substantial 
differences in wealth that are correlated with the timing of nursing home coverage by 
Medicaid.  
We next examine the effects of Medicaid in the 1990s on private savings, using data 
from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS).7  We exploit variation in whether states 
include assets that were used to purchase a Medicaid annuity as part of the applicant’s 
“countable” assets.  In general, Medicaid disregards some portion of an applicant’s assets 
                                                 
5 The household was observed in 1993 and the treatment (Medicaid) was implemented in 1965. 
6 The Medicaid program was introduced in 1965.  Prior to Medicaid, some states offered public insurance for 
nursing home care through the Medical Assistance for the Aged (MAA) program, which was introduced in 
1960.  Prior to 1960, there was very limited state and local assistance for nursing home care. 
7 There was less state variation in Medicaid eligibility in the 1990s, but we add this period to our study because 
behavior in the 1960s may not be generalizable to the present. 
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when determining eligibility.  All remaining assets are considered “countable” assets and 
used to determine eligibility.  To qualify for Medicaid, applicants must reduce countable 
assets to the state’s asset threshold (This is sometimes referred to as the Medicaid tax on 
assets).8  Assets that are disregarded are effectively exempt from the Medicaid tax on assets.  
Cross-state differences in whether the assets used to purchase Medicaid annuities are 
disregarded generate substantial differences in the effective Medicaid tax on assets.  As the 
effective tax on assets increases, the cost of using Medicaid services increases and the net 
benefit of the Medicaid program is reduced.  Therefore, households facing a higher tax on 
assets have a lower incentive to apply for Medicaid, and we expect private savings will be 
higher for these households.  We find that households in states with a higher effective 
Medicaid tax on assets save significantly more.  
 
Did the Introduction of Medicaid Reduce Private Savings? 
Public Assistance for Nursing Home Care in the 1960s 
Public assistance for nursing home care was first introduced in 1960 through the 
MAA program.9  Between 1960 and 1965, 20 states participated in the program.  In 1965, the 
Medicaid program was implemented, and by 1971 all states but Arizona had adopted the 
Medicaid program.10   In the 1960s, under the MAA program and then later under the 
Medicaid program, individuals qualified for state-supported nursing home care if their 
income and assets were below the state’s statutory eligibility thresholds.11 The income and 
                                                 
8 In 1971, the asset threshold ranged between $400 and $4,000.  
9 Prior to 1960, there was limited nursing home assistance for low-income households.  Public assistance was in 
the form of cash payments for medical care under the Old Age Assistance Program.  Assistance was also 
provided through state- or local-run institutions for the poor, infirmed, and elderly.   
10 The Medicaid program was implemented in Arizona in 1982. 
11 As noted earlier, there were only small differences across states in their statutory limits for income and assets. 
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asset thresholds were low across the states, but some states allowed individuals to subtract 
medical expenses from their gross income.  The individual would qualify if this net income 
was below the income eligibility threshold.  This means that individuals with high income 
could qualify for Medicaid coverage if their medical expenses were high enough.  These 
individuals qualified as “medically-needy” recipients.12   
Given the potentially high level of nursing home costs, the use of the medically-needy 
criterion substantially raised the effective income eligibility limit in medically-needy states.  
Thus, in the 1960s substantive variation in Medicaid eligibility existed across states, 
stemming from whether the state adopted the medically-needy criterion for eligibility. 
Although some states qualified medically-needy recipients under the MAA program, the 
scope of coverage for most states was limited. The scope of medically-needy coverage 
increased under the Medicaid program.  In 1966, 18 of the 51 states (including the District of 
Columbia) qualified medically-needy recipients and by 1970, 28 states covered medically-
needy recipients.  Table 1 shows the medically-needy states in selected years between 1960 
and 1970.13  
 
Estimation of Savings Effects of Medicaid in the 1960s 
 We examine whether there were any changes in household savings as a result of the 
introduction of social insurance for nursing home expenses.  If moral hazard was significant, 
we will observe reduced household savings after the introduction of Medicaid. However, 
                                                 
12 For example, suppose the income standard is $400. Then, in a medically-needy state, the individual qualifies 
if (income-medical expenses)  $400; whereas in a non medically-needy state, she qualifies if (income ≤ ≤  
$400). If nursing home expenses are $1,000 a month, this means the individual in a medically-needy state can 
have as much as $1,400 in income and still qualify for assistance.  
13 Since 209(b) states are allowed to deduct medical expenses from income to qualify, in spirit, these states are 
similar to medically-needy states. As such, I categorize 209(b) states as medically-needy states in Table 1. 
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simply comparing household wealth before and after 1965 is problematic. Changes in wealth 
during that period could have also been caused by business cycle fluctuations, changes in 
other economic factors or policies (such as Medicare, which was introduced in 1965), or 
differences in cohort saving behavior.  Without accounting for these factors, we would 
spuriously attribute observed differences in wealth to the introduction of the Medicaid 
program.     
We thus exploit the differences across states in medically-needy coverage, described 
above, to capture additional variation in Medicaid eligibility standards.  Figure 1 shows the 
distribution of medically-needy states in 1966, which is the distribution we adopt in this 
paper.  Households living in states that qualify individuals through the medically-needy 
criterion face higher effective income thresholds and therefore have greater access to state-
supported nursing home coverage than households living in states that do not qualify the 
medically-needy.  Households in states with the medically-needy qualifications need to save 
less, so their average household wealth should be lower.14  Using variation across states and 
years enables a difference-in-difference estimation.   
To identify the effect of the Medicaid medically-needy program on private savings in 
the 1960s, we use data from the 1962 and 1970 SCF.  The SCF surveyed households 
annually from 1946 to 1971, and each survey is nationally representative of the cross-section 
of non-institutionalized households at that time.15  The strengths of the 1962 and 1970 SCF 
data are that the data straddle the period when the Medicaid program was implemented; and, 
                                                 
14 The medically-needy criterion might affect savings in the opposite direction.  Households in states without a 
medically-needy program might save less so that they can qualify for Medicaid; households in states with a 
medically-needy program may save more because they know they will not have to be completely destitute to 
qualify.  Walker (2005) shows that this behavior is more likely to be adopted by households in the lower end of 
the income distribution and that the medically-needy criterion is less likely to be triggered for these households.  
15 See Federal Reserve Board, Reports on the Surveys of Consumer Finances, Federal Reserve Bulletin, 1947-
1959 for more details about the data. 
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more importantly, the data include the respondent’s state of residence.  The SCF data also 
include the household’s economic and demographic characteristics.  The limitation of the 
SCF is that it is not a panel and we cannot observe changes in household savings over time. 
Instead, we use the SCF to compare the net worth of cross sections of households over time 
and across states.   
In 1962, 2,117 households were interviewed, and in 1970, 2,576 households were 
interviewed.  In 1962, the household unit is defined as a spending unit whereas in 1970, the 
household unit is defined as a family unit.  For comparability across years, we use only single 
spending-unit households.  Limiting the sample further to heads of households gives 901 
households from 1962 and 1,743 households from 1970.  Because the risk of needing nursing 
home care tends to manifest among the very elderly, we anticipate that households are more 
likely to account for that risk in their saving decisions at older ages.  Therefore, we constrain 
the sample to include only households with heads between the ages of 45 and 75.   
Eliminating all cases with incomplete or missing information yields a final sample of 1,056 
households.16
Table 2 provides summary statistics of the 1962 and 1970 data.  We compare the 
characteristics of households in 1962 to households in 1970 and the characteristics of 
households in medically-needy states to households in non medically-needy states.  In 1962 
and 1970, about three-quarters of households are under the age of 65, around 70 percent of 
households are married, 70 percent own a home, 4 percent own a farm, and around 10 
percent are black.  Median household net worth is $72,600 in 1970 compared to $66,500 in 
1962.  A major difference between households in the two samples is the proportion of retired 
                                                 
16  Eliminating cases with zero or negative net worth reduces the sample further to 931 households. 
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households.  In 1962, only 3 percent of households in the 45-75 age group are retired, 
whereas in 1970, 18 percent of households are retired.  Households aged 62 and older in the 
1970 sample are far more likely to report being retired than similarly aged households in 
1962.  If differences in economic environment or in cohort behavior are generating the 
differences in retirement decisions and if retirement decisions affect private savings, then 
these differences will be absorbed by the time dummy.     
Households in medically-needy states are generally similar in observable 
characteristics to households in non medically-needy states.  In both groups, the age of the 
household head is around 57 years, about 70 percent of households are married, about 20 
percent are single female households, about 33 percent have children under the age of 18 
years, and about 4 percent of households own a farm.  Households in medically-needy states, 
however, tend to have higher wealth holdings.  There is a slightly lower proportion of black 
households in medically-needy states (11 percent compared to 14 percent), and a higher 
proportion of households in medically-needy states have 12 or more years of schooling.   
One concern in a difference-in-difference (DD) analysis is that there may be 
unobservable variables that are correlated with the regressor of interest (in this case, the 
interaction term of medically-needy states and post-Medicaid households.  The summary data 
from Table 2, however, indicate that households living in medically-needy states post 
Medicaid tend to have higher wealth than other households, which is contrary to the DD 
prediction we are testing.  Furthermore, none of the observable characteristics appear likely 
to exert a downward bias on the DD estimate.    
Using the 1962 and 1970 SCF data, we estimate the following equation using 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS):  
 8  
(1)  ititititititit ZYMNYMNW εβββββ ++++⋅+= 43210 1970)1970(log . 
where  is household net worth.itW
17 The variable  is a dichotomous variable which is 
set to one if the household lives in a state that qualifies the medically-needy,  is a 
dichotomous variable which is set to one if the household was observed in 1970, and  is a 
vector of control variables that includes age of the household head, marital status, race, 
presence of children younger than 18, years of schooling of household head, whether the 
household owns a home or a farm, and changes in median income and median housing values 




The coefficient on the  variable,itMN 2β , captures any time-invariant differences in 
net worth between states that covered the medically-needy post-Medicaid and those that did 
not.  Thus, it controls for policy endogeneity (for instance, perhaps really poor states were 
more likely to cover the medically-needy).  The coefficient on ,itY1970 3β , absorbs average 
differences in wealth between 1962 and 1970. The coefficient on the  term, )1970( itit YMN ⋅
1β , is the DD estimator of the effect of social insurance on savings.  It measures the average 
change in household wealth over time between medically-needy and non medically-needy 
states.  For the reasons stated above, we expect that 1β , will be negative: after controlling for 
policy endogeneity and year fixed effects, we anticipate that household wealth declined after 
the passage of Medicaid.  
If all households across the income distribution were saving for nursing home care, 
then the difference-in-different estimator, 1β , represents private savings for nursing home 
                                                 
17 The equation was also estimated with log of non-housing net worth as the dependent variable.  The sign and 
magnitude of the estimated coefficient of interest was largely similar; however, the estimated effect was not 
significant.  
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expenses.  However, as Walker (2006) shows, in the absence of public insurance, only 
certain households in the middle and upper tail of the income distribution will choose to self-
insure against nursing home expenses.  Some households, especially those in the lower tail of 
the income distribution, will choose not to save for nursing home expenses and rely instead 
on public or charitable sources of nursing home care.  Therefore, the estimated effect 
represents average private savings for nursing home care across the whole income 
distribution, and it should be interpreted as the lower bound for middle- to high-income 
households. 
 
Results: Changes in Private Savings in the 1960s 
Table 3 presents the results of the OLS estimates for three different age groups: 
households aged 45-74, aged 50-74, and aged 55-74.  As noted earlier, we anticipate that 
older households are more likely to account for the risk of nursing home expenses in their 
saving decisions.  If this is the case, then state Medicaid policies should have a larger effect 
on household wealth and the DD estimate should be larger for older households. 
 From column 1, we see that the effect of the Medicaid medically-needy program 
reduces private savings for households in the 45-74 age range, but the effect of the state 
policy is not statistically significant.  However, the effect among older households is 
significant.  Among households in the 50-75 age range, household net worth is 69 percent 
lower if they live in a medically-needy state.  Among even older households (those in the 55-
74 age range), household net worth is 82 percent lower for those in a medically-needy state.  
The median household in this age range held about $72,000 in net worth; therefore, we 
estimate that the medically-needy provision reduces private savings among these households 
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by almost $60,000.  The Medicaid reimbursement rate for nursing home care in 1971 was 
about $30,000 a year. This suggests that the medically-needy program crowds out 2 years of 
private savings for nursing home care.18   
While the 1960s provides some useful variation for testing the savings effects of 
Medicaid policy, relying on these early years of Medicaid to assess the current effects of 
Medicaid has number of limitations. First, behavior in the 1960s may not be generalizable to 
the present.  Second, because the SCF data in our analysis are made up of pooled cross 
sections, some differences in savings may reflect cohort differences.  Finally, the empirical 
strategy assumes that households were saving for nursing home care prior to the MAA and 
Medicaid programs.  Data from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services indicate that 
private expenditures for nursing home care as a percentage of total health care expenditures 
in the United States have hovered between 2.5 percent and 3.5 percent of total health care 
expenditures between 1960 and 2000.  Although these data lend validity to the assumption, 
we nonetheless turn to more recent policies and data from the Health and Retirement Study 
to study the effects of Medicaid in the 1990s.   
 
Do Medicaid Eligibility Rules Currently Affect Private Savings?  
Public Assistance for Nursing Home Care in the 1990s. 
 By the 1990s, Medicaid eligibility differences across States are quite small because 
States’ Medicaid income eligibility standards were mostly equalized.  Through enabling 
federal legislation, states that did not qualify individuals with high medical expenses through 
                                                 
18 All values are adjusted to 2005 dollars, using the CPI-U.  The Medicaid nursing home reimbursement rate in 
New York in 1971 was about $38,000 a year, and the reimbursement rate in California was about $24,000 a 
year (Sparer, 1993).   
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the medically needy program provided alternate routes to expanding coverage to non 
impoverished households.   These non-medically needy states can provide assistance to 
individuals with income up to 300 percent of the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefit 
amount.19  In 1992, the SSI monthly benefit amount was $422 for a single household, so 
individuals with monthly income up to $1,266 who were in a nursing home could qualify for 
Medicaid.20  Furthermore, individuals with income above the 300 percent limit can still 
qualify if the excess income is placed in a trust (the “Miller’s trust”) and the funds in the trust 
are applied towards nursing home costs.  
 Although the effective Medicaid income standards were mostly equalized by the 
1990s, there are still differences across states in the effective asset eligibility standards. The 
statutory asset limit for Medicaid nursing home eligibility in most states is $2,000.21  
Individuals who meet the income threshold but who exceed the asset threshold must draw 
down their assets to the state’s asset limit before Medicaid begins to pay benefits (This is 
sometimes referred to as the Medicaid tax on assets).  However, the computation of whether 
the applicant’s assets meet the state’s statutory asset limit varies by state; and this variation in 
how assets are “counted” leads to variation in eligibility standards.    
There are two ways in which states vary in the computation of an applicant’s assets.  
First, when a married applicant applies for Medicaid nursing home assistance, each state 
specifies the amount of household assets that is set aside for the non-institutionalized spouse. 
This amount ranges from $17,000 to $87,000.  As a consequence, the level of household 
assets that is attributable to the institutionalized spouse varies by state.   
                                                 
19 This eligibility standard is sometimes referred to as the “special income” rule or “300 percent rule.” 
20 The maximum SSI monthly benefit amount for couples in 1992 was $633.  However, when an individual 
applies for Medicaid nursing home assistance, the applicant is considered single at that point, even if the 
applicant is married.  
21 Most states disregard the value of the house, a car, and personal items.  
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The second cross-state difference in eligibility arises through differences in the 
definition of countable assets. In recent years, this difference comes largely from differences 
in whether assets that were used to purchase an annuity are considered part of the 
household’s “countable” assets when the applicant applies for Medicaid assistance.  In 
general, Medicaid disregards some portion of an applicant’s assets when determining 
eligibility.  All remaining assets are considered “countable” assets and used to determine 
eligibility.  In order to qualify for Medicaid assistance, applicants must reduce countable 
assets to the state’s asset threshold (this is sometimes referred to as the Medicaid tax on 
assets).22  Assets that are disregarded are, effectively, exempt from the Medicaid tax on 
assets.   Annuities present a challenge for eligibility determination because the purchase of an 
annuity converts a stock of assets to a flow of income. Thus, assets that would previously 
have made a household ineligible for Medicaid are not visible. For those assets to be 
“disregarded” for Medicaid eligibility, federal law requires that the annuity be actuarially fair 
and irrevocable (also known as a Medicaid annuity).23   Assets used to purchase annuities 
that do not meet these criteria are considered countable assets, and applicants face a penalty 
period during which they are ineligible for Medicaid coverage. This penalty period is 
proportional to the purchased value of the annuity.24
“Medicaid-compliant” annuities can be structured in a variety of ways that maximize 
the amount of assets that can be transferred to an heir, thereby circumventing some of the 
                                                 
22 In 1971, the asset threshold ranged between $400 and $4,000.  
23 Most state Medicaid offices define an actuarially-fair annuity as an annuity with a contract length that 
matches the SSI life expectancy tables.  An irrevocable contract is a contract that is paying or will begin 
payments within one month of the nursing home application.   
24 Prior to 1993, annuities that were purchased within 24 months of the application were subject to this test (the 
period of retrospective evaluation was called the “look-back” period).  The passage of  OBRA 1993 increased 
the “look-back” period to 36 months.  Legislation passed in 2006 raised the “look-back” period further to 60 
months and changed the computation of the penalty period. 
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Medicaid tax on assets.  For example, annuities can be structured with a low income stream 
and a balloon payment at the end of the contract period.  If the annuitant dies before the end 
of the contract period, the remaining payouts and balloon payment will transfer to the 
remainder beneficiary.  In addition, annuity contracts can be specified for longer than the 
annuitant’s expected lifespan; at death, payments continue to the remainder beneficiary.  
Alternatively, annuities can be purchased for family members.  States differ in what types of 
alternate annuity structures are considered Medicaid-complaint.   
Differences in state regulation of annuities can potentially generate substantial cross-
state differences in the amount of an applicant’s assets that are “taxed” by the Medicaid 
program.  The differences in the resulting “Medicaid tax” may generate differences in 
savings patterns across states. Households living in states with a higher effective Medicaid 
tax face higher costs to applying for Medicaid nursing home; therefore, these households 
have a lower incentive to seek Medicaid assistance.25  Even though the tax is effective only 
at very old ages and only if the individual applies for Medicaid assistance, households should 
form expectations about the risk of needing Medicaid nursing home assistance, which would 
affect savings and consumption growth rates.26 If so, then households living in states with 
more restrictive rules regarding Medicaid annuities are less likely to apply for Medicaid 
assistance and private savings will be higher, on average, in these states.   
Alternatively, the Medicaid tax on assets may affect how much households “dissave” 
in their retirement years. Households in states where it is difficult to protect one’s assets 
                                                 
25 Households should also redistribute resources to maximize the expected return of their assets by shifting 
resources towards assets with lower expected marginal tax rates.  Because the expected marginal Medicaid tax 
rate on annuities is zero until the individual is within the Medicaid “look-back” period, which tends to be when 
the individual is well past retirement age, we do not expect this incentive to affect private savings rate during 
the household’s labor earning years.   
26 In a consumption Euler equation, this enters as uncertainty about out-of-pocket medical expenses.   
 14  
through annuities may dissave more and transfer a greater share of their assets at any point in 
time than households in other states.  In this instance, we expect private savings to be lower 
in states with more restrictive Medicaid annuity rules. To examine the relationship between 
private savings and Medicaid annuity rules, we examine changes in households wealth in the 
1990s using the HRS data. 
 
Estimation of Private Savings for Nursing Home Care in the 1990s 
We use the 1992 and 2002 waves of the HRS data to test whether Medicaid affects 
private savings. The HRS data are representative of non-institutionalized individuals who 
were aged 51-61 at the time of the first interview in 1992.  Respondents have been re-
interviewed every two years and continue to be re-interviewed until they die.  In 2002, this 
original sample was aged 61-71. The HRS is useful because it reports the state of residence 
for each household (through restricted access) and because it follows households over time. 
These panel data contain measures of household wealth in each wave, allowing us to 
generate measures of changes in wealth and saving rates.  Table 4 provides detailed statistics 
on wealth and changes in wealth in the HRS data.   
We rely on cross-state variation in Medicaid annuity rules during this period to 
identify any Medicaid-induced changes in savings among households.  We sort states into 
three groups: least restrictive, restrictive, and most restrictive.  Figure 2 shows the 
distribution of states by the level of their Medicaid annuity rules restriction.  States that are 
more restrictive can be regarded as having a higher effective Medicaid tax on assets.27  Table 
5, which contains summary statistics for our regression variables, shows that 23 percent of 
                                                 
27 We obtain these classifications from Levy, et al. (2006). See also Levy, et al. (2005) for more details on state 
Medicaid annuity rules. 
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our sample live in a most restrictive state, 18 percent live in a restrictive state, and 59 percent 
live in a least restrictive state. We estimate the following equation: 
(2) 02 9292 0 1 2 4 5log 3logi j j i iW Medium Low W X Z j iβ β β β β βΔ = + + + + + ε+  
where the left hand side measures the change in log net worth between 1992 and 2002, 
controlling for the 1992 log net worth of the household, . Because home equity is not 
considered for Medicaid eligibility, we estimate (2) using both total wealth and wealth 
excluding home equity. 
92
iW
jMedium  is a dichotomous variable that is set to one if the 
household lives in a state with a medium level of restriction on Medicaid annuities and jLow  
is a dichotomous variable set to one if the household lives in a state with the lowest level of 
restrictions. Households in the most restrictive states are the reference group.  
If greater Medicaid annuity restrictions make Medicaid less desirable and lead to 
greater self-insurance, we expect the coefficients 1β  and 2β  to be negative.  Households in 
more restrictive states might save more because it is more costly to rely on Medicaid 
assistance.  If, however, higher restrictions on Medicaid annuity leads households save less 
or dissave faster, we would find 1β  and 2β  to be positive.  Households in less restrictive 
states might save more because they know that they will be able to protect these assets from 
long-term care expenses. 
Because state policies may be correlated with state characteristics that correlate with 
household savings, we include some state-level controls in the jZ  vector.
28  These are the 
elderly poverty rate, median elderly income, the mean nursing home daily rate, and the 
median home price.  We also control for household-level characteristics in the X vector. 
                                                 
28 We cannot include state fixed effects because our policy variable does not change over time and given that, 
we are only observing wealth changes over one time period. 
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These include age; age squared; dummy variables for self-rated health (good health is the 
reference group); dummy variables for household type (married is the reference group); years 
of education; Black race; dummy variables for whether the household had children; owns a 
home, stocks, or IRAs; dummy variables for whether the household has a pension; or is 
retired at baseline; the natural log of 1992 household income and the occupation at the last 
held job. Income and occupation are specifically meant to proxy for lifetime earnings.  
The analysis is performed at the household level. Individual characteristics such as 
education, age and occupation are taken at baseline and are from the “household head”, 
defined to be the husband in a married household.  If a household divorces between 1992 and 
2002, we consider the household to be two separate households for the entire period. We 
restrict our analysis to households aged 51-58 in 1992 (who are then 61-68 in 2002) to reduce 
the chance that some households have already entered nursing homes or started dissaving.  
 
Results: Changes in Private Savings in the 1990s 
 We first estimate (2) among all households aged 51-58 in 1992 who have positive 
wealth. We estimate the equation using both household net worth and non-housing net worth.  
Results for total net worth are reported in column 1 of Table 6.29  Column 1 shows that the 
coefficients on Medium and Low are negative for both all wealth and non-housing wealth, 
indicating that households in states with less restrictive annuity policies save less than those 
in the most restrictive states. The coefficients are not always statistically significant, 
however. Because protection of assets from long-term care expenses may be a much bigger 
                                                 
29 Results using non-housing net worth are generally similar and are not reported in this paper.   
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concern for married households, we next estimate (2) among households married at baseline, 
and we focus most of our discussion on this sample. 
 Column 2 of Table 6 presents results for households married at baseline. We include 
dummy variables indicating the 2002 marital status of the household, since some households 
may have divorced or become widowed and this may have had a big effect on their wealth. 
Again, the coefficients on the Medium and Low are negative, suggesting that households in 
the most restrictive states save more.  The coefficients are all statistically significant at either 
the 5 percent or 10 percent level.  The magnitude of the coefficients does not suggest a 
monotonic relationship between restrictiveness and saving, however: those in Medium 
restrictive states seem to save the most. The magnitude on the total wealth specification 
implies that households in the most restrictive states save 18 percent less (or dissave 18 
percent more) than households in medium restrictive states and 9 percent less than 
households in least restrictive states.  The estimated effect on non-housing wealth is similar, 
though the magnitudes are somewhat larger.   
The results suggests that very restrictive Medicaid annuity policies lead to greater 
savings, perhaps because households are more likely to self-insure when Medicaid is more 
restrictive.  There is no evidence that the higher effective Medicaid tax in these states results 
in reduced saving. The fact that the coefficients increase in magnitude when we restrict the 
sample to married households are consistent with the fact that that asset protection and thus 
Medicaid rules should be more important to individuals with a spouse. 
 Estimated coefficients for covariates are generally not surprising.  A higher level of 
baseline wealth is associated with lower savings rates though greater baseline income, being 
a homeowner, owning stocks and having an IRA are associated with greater savings rates. 
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Better health, more years of education, and staying married through 2002 are all associated 
with higher savings rates. Having children (who may be adults) is associated with lower 
savings rates. 
 If our results truly reflect incentives created by Medicaid, we would expect larger 
estimated effects among individuals who think they are more likely to need long-term care 
services. To see if this is the case, we estimate (2) among households in fair or poor health at 
baseline, among households married at baseline. The sample size is small, but the results in 
Table 7 provide some evidence of stronger responses among those in poor health. The 
coefficients on Medium restrictiveness are significantly larger that those estimated among all 
married households, though the coefficients on Less restrictive states are not significant. 
Among households in fair or poor health, living in a state with less restrictive Medicaid 
eligibility is associated with 35% greater savings in total wealth and 48% greater saving in 
non-housing wealth.  
 
Conclusion 
In a recent survey of TIAA-CREF annuitants, respondents indicated that concern 
about nursing home expenses is one of the primary reasons for saving (Heim, 1992).30  
Despite the survey response, the average elderly household in 2004 held insufficient funds to 
finance a long stay in a nursing home.  The median married and single elderly households 
held $89,000 and $14,000, respectively, in non-housing assets. At these levels, private 
                                                 
30 Fifty-three percent of respondents indicated that saving for nursing home expenses was extremely or very 
important where as 49 percent of respondents indicated that saving for retirement consumption was extremely 
or very important.  
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savings could finance 18 months of care for a married person and only 3 months of care for 
an unmarried elderly person.31   
The shortfall in financial resources for nursing home expenses may reflect moral 
hazard due to the existence of social insurance. or it could simply be a result of 
shortsightedness or incomplete planning. Regardless of the reason, the presence of the 
Medicaid program largely ensures that individuals with insufficient resources will receive 
services when needed.  The implications for public policy, however, differ tremendously 
depending on the underlying reason for the shortfall.  In the case of incomplete planning, 
Medicaid functions as a safety net for individuals with insufficient funds for nursing home 
care.  If, however, financial shortfall for nursing home expenses is largely due to moral 
hazard, then public policy could potentially be targeted to restructure saving incentives for 
nursing home expenses.  If incomplete planning explains the financial shortfall, then there 
should be no systematic correlation between household wealth and Medicaid policies; 
however, if systematic differences are observed, it provides evidence of moral hazard. 
This paper examines the extent to which private savings responds to the availability 
of Medicaid nursing home assistance.  The paper uses variation in state Medicaid policies in 
the 1960s and 1990s to identify whether household wealth correlates negatively with access 
to public insurance coverage.  The data for the analysis are from the 1962 and 1970 Survey 
of Consumer Finances and the 1992 through 2002 Health and Retirement Study.  The paper 
finds that household savings in 1970 is substantially lower in states with easier access to 
Medicaid assistance; and household savings in the 1990s are lower when the cost of 
                                                 
31  Authors own calculations using data from the 1998 Health and Retirement Study.  Non-housing assets are 
computed for households with at least one person between ages 65 and 70 years old.  Non-married households 
include widows and persons who are separated, divorced, or never been married.  The corresponding median 
household net worth for married and single elderly households are $195,000 and $68,000, respectively. 
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participating in the Medicaid program is lower.  Together, the results provide evidence of 
moral hazard.  
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MAA States* Medicaid Medicaid States
State 1963 Implemented 1966 1970
ALABAMA 1970
ALASKA 1972 ---
ARIZONA 1982 --- ---
ARKANSAS X 1970
CALIFORNIA X 1966 X X
COLORADO 1969 ---
CONNECTICUT X 1966 X X
DELAWARE 1966
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA X 1968 --- X
FLORIDA 1970 ---
GEORGIA 1967 ---
HAWAII X 1966 X X
IDAHO X 1966
ILLINOIS 1966 X X
INDIANA 1970 --- X
IOWA 1967 ---
KANSAS 1967 --- X
KENTUCKY X 1966 X X
LOUISIANA X 1966
MAINE 1966
MARYLAND 1966 X X
MASSACHUSETTS X 1966 X X
MICHIGAN X 1966 X X
MINNESOTA 1966 X X
MISSISSIPPI 1970 --- X




NEW HAMPSHIRE 1967 --- X
NEW JERSEY 1970
NEW MEXICO 1966
NEW YORK X 1966 X X
NORTH CAROLINA 1970 X
NORTH DAKOTA X 1966 X X
OHIO 1966 X X
OKLAHOMA X 1966 X X
OREGON X 1967 ---
PENNSYLVANIA X 1966 X X
RHODE ISLAND 1966 X X
SOUTH CAROLINA X 1968 ---
SOUTH DAKOTA 1967 ---
TENNESSEE X 1969 ---
TEXAS 1967 ---
UTAH X 1966 X X
VERMONT 1966 X X
VIRGINIA 1969 --- X
WASHINGTON X 1966 X
WEST VIRGINIA X 1966
WISCONSIN 1966 X X
WYOMING 1967 ---
Notes: 
"X" - the state covers the medically-needy. "--" indicate the state had no Medicaid program that year.
"*" denotes MAA states that covered nursing home care.
Medically-needy states allow individuals to deduct medical expenses from income to 
qualify for the Medicaid program. Medically-needy states include 209(b) states.
The MAA program is the Medical Assistance for the Aged program. MAA states allowed spend-down. 
Data compiled from: Bruen, et.al (1999), Burwell and Rymer (1987), 
Health Care Financing Administraion (1970, 1980, 1984, 1986), Special Committee on Aging (1963)
Congressional Research Service (1988, 1993), Health Law Project (1972)
Table 1 : Medically-Needy States between 1960 and 1970 
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Comparing Across Years
Mean Std Dev. Mean Std Dev.
Household Net Worth* 151,577 296,259 190,385 578,164
Median Net Worth 66,461 72,639
Non-Housing Financial Assets 95,812 254,208 121,182 508,989
Median Financial Assets 16,917 12,495
Age of Head 56.7 8.5 56.9 8.4
Percent Married Household 0.70 0.46 0.72 0.45
Percent Single Female Households 0.20 0.40 0.22 0.42
Percent Black Households 0.79 0.41 0.78 0.42
Percent Retired Households 0.03 0.17 0.18 0.39
Percent with Children Under 18 Years 0.36 0.48 0.32 0.47
Percent Own Home 0.70 0.46 0.70 0.46
Percent Own Farm 0.04 0.19 0.04 0.18
Percent with 12+ Years of Schooling 0.37 0.42
Percent Live in Medically-Needy States 0.50 0.55
Number of Observations 401 655
Comparing Across States
Mean Std Dev. Mean Std Dev.
Household Net Worth* 189,901 548,424 159,616 416,464
Median Net Worth 84,799 61,634
Non-Housing Financial Assets 120,137 467,269 101,886 384,998
Median Financial Assets 20,222 10,244
Age of Head 56.44 8.18 57.31 8.62
Percent Married Household 0.70 0.46 0.72 0.45
Percent Single Female Households 0.21 0.41 0.22 0.41
Percent Black Households 0.07 0.26 0.14 0.35
Percent Retired Households 0.11 0.31 0.14 0.35
Percent with Children Under 18 Years 0.33 0.47 0.33 0.47
Percent Own Home 0.67 0.47 0.72 0.45
Percent Own Farm 0.03 0.17 0.04 0.21
Percent with 12+ Years of Schooling 0.47 0.36
Percent observed in 1970 0.64 0.60
Number of Observations 559 497
Notes: * In 2005 dollars, using CPI-U
Medically-needy states allow individuals to deduce medical expenses from income 
Table 2: Summary Statistics of 1962 and 1970 Survey of Consumer Finances
1962 1970
Medically-Needy State Medically-Needy State
Non
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Dependent Variable: Log (Net Worth + 1) (1) (2) (3)
Age Group 45-74 50-74 55-74
Live in State with Medically-Needy Program 0.523 0.609 0.699
(0.269)* (0.308)** (0.365)*
Y1970 -0.329 -0.056 0.217
(0.241) (0.273) (0.320)
Medically-Needy State * Y1970 -0.466 -0.689 -0.822
(0.334) (0.383)* (0.450)*
Age of Head 0.202 -0.477 0.033
(0.148) (0.255)* (0.472)
Age Square -0.001 0.004 -0.000
(0.001) (0.002)* (0.004)
Single Male Household -0.754 -0.520 -0.526
(0.319)** (0.352) (0.396)
Single Female Household -0.629 -0.443 -0.492
(0.207)*** (0.225)** (0.253)*
Black Household -1.734 -2.150 -2.111
(0.278)*** (0.314)*** (0.381)***
Any Children Under 18 Years -0.740 -0.882 -1.076
(0.199)*** (0.240)*** (0.315)***
Schooling: <=8 Years -1.373 -1.288 -1.443
(0.226)*** (0.263)*** (0.313)***
Schooling: 9-11 Years -0.540 -0.684 -0.859
(0.252)** (0.296)** (0.368)**
Schooling: 13+ Years 0.542 0.525 0.342
(0.250)** (0.302)* (0.363)
Own Home 5.525 5.356 5.770
(0.192)*** (0.217)*** (0.256)***
Own Farm 6.780 6.403 6.739
(0.457)*** (0.527)*** (0.684)***
State Controls Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.718 22.023 5.208
(4.305) (7.765)*** (15.090)
Observations 1056 781 584
R-squared 0.57 0.57 0.59
Data: 1962 and 1970 survey of Consumer Finances.
State controls include changes in median income and median housing values in the state.
Medically-needy states allow individuals to deduce medical expenses from income 
to meet the state's income threshold.
Standard errors in parentheses.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 3 : Ordinary Least Square Estimates: 
The Effect of Medicaid Medically-Needy Criterion on Private Savings
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Sample Size Mean Standard Deviation 25th %ile 50th %ile 75th %ile
All Wealth
Levels
1992 Wealth 4,198 214,162 491,134 24,000 84,025 210,100
2002 Wealth 4,230 351,612 1,039,165 35,000 137,850 375,900
Change in Wealth 4,198 138,783 953,596 -4,700 35,875 172,000
Natural Log
ln 1992 Wealth 3,819 11.29 1.71 10.55 11.50 12.35
ln 2002 Wealth 3,912 11.68 1.91 10.90 11.98 12.91
Change in ln Wealth 3,653 0.44 1.34 -0.10 0.51 1.10
Non-Housing or Business Wealth
Levels
1992 Wealth 4,198 111,355 321,370 4,000 26,200 96,000
2002 Wealth 4,230 203,867 833,983 5,000 42,000 187,736
Change in Wealth 4,198 93,580 792,157 -7,000 7,850 86,000
Natural Log
ln 1992 Wealth 3,666 10.33 1.91 9.21 10.53 11.65
ln 2002 Wealth 3,728 10.73 10.73 9.43 11.00 12.30
Change in ln Wealth 3,383 0.46 1.62 -0.43 0.55 1.40
Notes: Sample sizes vary due to missing data. Sample sizes for natural log statistics are lower because of zero and negative wealth.
Statistics for levels of variables includes households with zero or negative wealth.
Table 4: Detailed Destribution of Wealth Variables, Among Households Interviewed in 1992 and 2002
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Mean Std. Dev.
Change in 2002-1992 ln wealth 0.45 1.33
Change in 2002-1992 ln wealth (non-housing) 0.47 1.60
Age 54.47 2.31
Health=Excellent/Very Good 0.56 0.50
Health=Fair/Poor 0.16 0.36
Years of Education 12.56 3.07
Black Race 0.14 0.35
Has Children 0.94 0.24
Homeowner 0.83 0.38
Stock Holder 0.31 0.46
Has IRA 0.43 0.49
Has Pension 0.48 0.50
Retired 0.07 0.26
Houshold Income (levels) 54,737 52,316
ln Household Income 10.61 0.84
Household Type
   Married 0.73
   Single Male 0.10
   Single Female 0.18
State Characteristics
    Elderly Poverty Rate 11.10 2.88
    Median Elderly Income 36,641 4,100
    Median Home Price 123,479 40,637
    Mean Daily Nursing Home Price 155.26 37.80
State Annuity Policy
    Most Restrictive 0.23
    Restrictive 0.18
    Least Restrictive 0.59
Sample Size 3,607
Table 5: Summary Statistics of Regression Variables for HRS Regression Sample
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Dependent Variable:
Change in Log Net Worth (2002-1992)
Log Net Worth in 1992 -0.527 -0.518
(0.018) *** (0.021) ***
Medium Medicaid Annuity Restrictions -0.137 -0.185
(0.064) ** (0.067) ***




Age Squared 0.000 0.002
(0.004) (0.005)
Health: Excellent or Very Good 0.179 0.080
(0.047) *** (0.050)
Health: Fair or Poor -0.150 -0.189
(0.064) ** (0.068) ***
Single Male Household 0.035 -0.653
(0.072) (0.092) ***
Single Female Household -0.202 -0.595
(0.061) *** (0.068) ***
Years of Education 0.046 0.048
(0.009) *** (0.009) ***
Black -0.106 -0.093
(0.060) * (0.069)
Have Children -0.123 -0.197
(0.084) (0.121)
Own Home 0.420 0.353
(0.064) *** (0.075) ***
Own Stocks 0.215 0.183
(0.048) *** (0.050) ***
Own IRA 0.334 0.342
(0.047) *** (0.049) ***




Log Household Income 0.170 0.154
(0.032) *** (0.037) ***
State Controls Yes Yes
Observation 3,607 2,624
R-squared 0.226 0.258
Data: 1992 and 2002 Health and Retirement Study.  
Omitted variable: states with very restrictive Medicaid annuity rules.
State controls include elderly poverty rate, median elderly income, the mean nursing home daily rate,
and the median home price
Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 6: Ordinary Least Squares Estimates:
(1) (2)
The Effect of Medicaid Annuity Rules on Private Savings
Full Sample Married Only
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Change in^
Dependent Variable: Log Net Worth Log Non-Housing Net Worth
Log Net Worth in 1992 -0.546 -0.671
(0.065) *** (0.0623) ***
Medium Medicaid Annuity Restriction -0.353 -0.480
0.217 (0.261) *




Data: 1992 and 2002 Health and Retirement Study.  ^ - change between 1992 and 2002
Omitted variable: states with very restrictive Medicaid annuity rules.
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
The Effect of Medicaid Annuity Rules on Private Savings
Change in^
Table 7: Among Individuals Most likely to Apply for Medicaid Assistance
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